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H.B. 182 effects a substantial revision of the income tax laws
relating to corporate distributions, liquidations and reorganizations, so as to bring them generally in line with the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.
H. B. 232 amends the Colorado inheritance tax law so that it
is in conformity with the 1954 Revenue Code with respect to the
credit against the federal estate tax for the inheritance tax paid.
It also requires the filing of a copy of the Federal estate tax return
with the Inheritance Tax Commissioner in every estate where such
a return was filed.
Several other statutes were passed relating to the general
property tax but in general they effected only procedural changes.

PROPERTY LAW
By WILLIAM B. PAYNTER, of the Colorado Bar

(1) BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-USED CAR LOTS AND HOUSE TRAILERS
Cases which deal with building restrictions are Taylor v.
Melton, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1, p. 23 and Pagel v. Gisi,
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 478. Both involved the question
of the effect of actual notice of building restrictions contained in
an original deed but omitted in subsequent deeds.
In Taylor v. Melton, supra, plaintiffs alleged in substance,
that one Fairley who was the owner of a parcel of land, platted
and subdivided same and a map thereof was filed February 4, 1941,
in the office of the County Clerk and Recorder; that Fairley sold a
portion of the tract to Nesbitts, the deed to which was dated
March 20, 1941, and thereafter recorded and which deed provided
that neither the grantees nor their successors and assigns would
construct a residence on the land of a cost less than $2,500; the
grantor covenanting that he would not build or permit to be built
upon any of the land standing in his name in the particular subdivision, any structure other than a residence of construction value
of not less than $2,500; the above restrictions being a covenant
running with the land and binding upon the grantor, his successors and assigns forever.
It was further alleged that plaintiffs were the owners of certain lots in said Fairley Addition and defendants the owners of
Lot Three thereof; that plaintiffs and defendants respectively
acquired their titles to said lots or parcels of land with notice and
knowledge of the restrictions set forth in the deed to the Nesbitts
and notwithstanding said restrictions, the defendants in February,
1952, planned and commenced and intended to complete a structure to be utilized as a used car lot, in violation of said restrictions.
The trial judge inspected the premises and found thereon a
one room small building used as an office, a number of cars parked
on the lot and the same was being used as a used and new automobile sales lot and that in addition thereto defendants had built
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a cinder block building with a composition roof, being a building
of proper size for a home, but that same had not been completed,
there being no floors or partitions built therein and which was
intended to be used as an office building for the used and new car
lot or as a filling station.
Defendants denied that they had knowledge of any restrictions and alleged that none were contained in the deed conveying
Lot Three to them. The Court found that the defendants purchased
Lot Three with knowledge that there were certain restrictions
which covered the larger portion of the ten acre tract of which said
lot was a portion, both as a result of conversations with Fairley
and constructive notice of said restrictions as set out in the abstract of title.
Among other things the defendants contended that the only
covenant made by a grantee in any deed containing restrictions
was not to build a residence costing less than $2,500 and that this
did not prevent business use of the property; that when the grantor
Fairley provided in the deed to the Nesbitts he would not build
nor permit to be built upon the land retained by him "any structure
other than a residence," subsequent grantees who acquired property without restrictions in their deeds of conveyance were not
bound by Fairley's promise and further that the deed from Fairley
to Nesbitt did not create a restriction against a business use enforceable by those plaintiffs who held lots under deed from Fairley,
which contained no specific restrictions. The lower court found
that the restrictions applied to all property owned by Fairley at
the time of the deed to Nesbitts and that the plain meaning of same
was that no structure other than a dwelling and necessary outbuildings could be constructed, a dwelling being defined in its
ordinary meaning as a house occupied as a residence and that such
restriction would be violated by the uses contemplated by defendants.
The Supreme Court in affirming the decision of the lower court,
held that the common grantor Fairley, imposed the restriction in
question, in pursuance of a general plan for the development and
improvement of all lots included within his plat and further that
the defendants who purchased lots from Fairley subsequent to the
latters deed to the Nesbitts, were bound by the covenant.
The Court, quoting Thompson on Real Property, determined
the applicable rule to be that a subsequent grantee is required to
take notice of a building restriction contained in the original deed
even though such restriction does not appear in the subsequent
deeds and that "Where the deed to the first lot sold, provides for
a building restriction on the grantors other lots in the same subdivision, the purchasers of such other lots will take title subject
to such restrictions."
The case of Pagel v. Gisi, supra, from the District Court of
Yuma County, was a class action brought by plaintiffs to enforce
a general plan of restriction as to the use of the land in Hoch Park
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Addition to the Town of Yuma, Colorado. In their complaint,
plaintiffs alleged that a house trailer parked upon a lot belonging
to defendant, Pagel, violated a restriction that the premises, "will
be used for dwelling houses only and that any dwelling which is
hereafter erected by the party of the second part, his successors
and assigns on this lot to be at a cost of not less than $4,000, or to
be upon plans to be approved by the grantor, his heirs and assigns,
should said dwelling be of less value."
The evidence disclosed that plaintiffs were the owners of lots
the deeds to which contained the restrictions mentioned or that
they were the owners of lots conveyed without written restrictions,
but who recognized and conformed to the general plan of restricted
use.
The trial court found that defendant, Pagel, was fully advised of the restricted conditions concerning the property before
he acquired same and that in addition the general development of
the area disclosed unmistakably that it was being developed for
the use of new permanent homes.
For the reversal of the case it was argued that no general or
specific plan of restrictions was ever shown to exist; that said restrictions were personal to the grantor, Hoch; that the defendant
was using his property for a dwelling house only and because the
restrictions were not contained in his deed, they were not binding
upon him.
The court held that as a general rule the omission of a restrictive covenant contemplated by the general plan of development
of a subdivision, through inadvertence or otherwise, in a conveyance of one of the lots by the subdivider, does not prevent enforcement of the restriction against the immediate grantee of such lot
or his successor in title, if either took with notice of the restriction
or knowledge of the general plan; that there was ample competent
evidence in the record to sustain the finding of the trial court that
the area was being used exclusively for construction of new permanent homes and that a house trailer is not a permanent home,
but "a portable unit designed to be hauled from place to place by
an automobile or truck."
(2) COLORABLE TRANSFERS-RIGHTS OF SPOUSE AND OTHER
PROSPECTIVE HEIRS
In two cases the Supreme Court affirmed the rule of Thuete v.
Thuete, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P. 2d 604, decided in 1953, in which it
was again held that in Colorado, the owner of property has the
right to convey same without the consent or knowledge of the
spouse or other prospective heirs and that the mere fact that such
conveyance will deprive a surviving spouse of the right to inherit
an interest in the property does not make the conveyance fraudulent or invalid; that such deed may be manually delivered to a
third person, with instruction to deliver to the grantee upon the
grantors death and that it is not essential to valid delivery to a
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third person that the grantee know of the existence of the deed
before the grantors death.
In Moedy v. Moedy, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 3, Della
Moedy commenced a divorce action against her husband, Otto in
which she joined as defendant, George 0. Moedy, son of Otto, in
order that the property previously conveyed by Otto to George
might be subjected to her claim for support and maintenance.
During the pendency of the action Otto died and the suit proceeded
against George as grantee in the deed. Della and Otto were married September 17, 1946, at which time Otto owned property near
Fort Collins, rated to have a valuation of approximately $10,000,
which was the subject of the action. In January, 1950, Otto conveyed the property to himself and George in joint tenancy. It
was contended that if the deed was executed by the husband with
intent to deprive the wife of support and right of maintenance it
should be considered a fraud on the wife's rights and void under
Section 17, Chapter 71, 1935, C.S.A., now 59-1-17, 1953, C.R.S.,
providing that every conveyance made with the intent to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful suits
and demands, forfeited debts or demands shall be void. Reliance
was had by the wife on Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128;
24 Colo. 527, 52 Pac. 790, followed in Grover v. Grover, 69 Colo.
72, 169 Pac. 578, in which it was held that where it appears that
the husband's conveyance of his property was colorable merely
and was made with intent to deprive the wife of these benefits, it
is as much of a fraud on the part of the husband as it for a debtor
to put his property beyond his control. The Court in Moedy v.
Moedy said that while the theory as so announced in the Smith
case has not been definitely overruled by our Court, it has been
disapproved by not being followed in Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo.
594, 45 P. 2d 638 and Burton v. Burton., 100 Colo. 567, 569, 69 P.
2d 307. Therefore it would seem that a wife does not stand in
the position of a judgment creditor, and reference is made to
Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 71 Pac. 363, where the basis of the
present rule was announced, that a husband may dispose of his
property for the express purpose of defeating his wife's right to
maintenance and to share in his estate unless the transaction be
colorable merely, which is defined in Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516,
216 Pac. 257, as being "counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth (Webster) not really intended as a deed."
The question of burden of proof was also involved, it being
contended that plaintiff established a prima-facie case and that
thereupon the burden was on defendant to prove the transaction
was bona fide. The Court held that while such rule may be applied in certain other types of action it was not applicable here.
It pointed out that mental competency was not a issue, that while
it was claimed the deed was a result of undue influence there was
no direct evidence to this effect and that in addition to the rule
which forbids speculating upon the evidence, there is another

DICTA

Nov.-Dec., 1955

which demands that a deed may be declared void only upon proof
of undue influence, the burden thereof resting upon the one asserting it to prove that the degree of improper influence upon the
grantor sufficient to overcome his will and cause him to do that
which as a free agent he would not have done. In addition to
blood relationship between Otto and George it was contended that
other badges of fraud were that the conveyance was made without
the consent of the wife; that it deprived her of rights to support
and inheritance and that the deed was delivered to a third party
and not the grantee, which, said the Court, are answered adversely
to the wife's position in the recent cases of Thuete v. Thuete, supra,
and Bostron v. Bostron, 128 Colo. 535, 265 P. 2d 230.
Kauffman v. Kauffman, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 5, involved a written contract for the purchase by a son from his
father of irrigated land in Routt County. The purchase price was
$5,600 payable $600 at the time of the execution of the contract
and the balance in five equal annual installments of $1,000 each.
The contract provided that in case of the death of the seller
all payments due thereon should be cancelled and deed delivered
to the purchaser; that in case of death of the purchaser prior to the
full payment of the contract, the seller might pay to the estate of
the purchaser, all payments which had been made by him and upon
such payment the contract should be null and void and of no effect.
The agreement also provided that failure to make one or more
of the payments by the purchaser, or failure in performance of
any covenants to be performed by the purchaser, the agreement
might be terminated at the election of the seller, upon thirty days
notice of intention so to do.
The seller departed this life and suit was filed by the purchaser
against the administratrix of the decedent's estate, who was
purchaser's step-mother and widow of the seller and against the
bank also, for delivery of the deed. It was further alleged that the
purchaser and deceased had entered into verbal modification of
the contract sale to the effect that decedent was to have the use of
the property and pay all expenses incidental to its use in lieu of
the annual payments as provided.
The administratrix filed her answer, in which she alleged that
the execution of the agreement was an attempted testamentary
disposition of property instead of a bona fide agreement; she further denied the alleged modification agreement and alleged that it
was void, since it was not to be performed within one year of
the making thereof, concerned the sale of lands; was not in writing and was not subscribed by the deceased.
Upon the proposition that the contract was in effect a testamentary disposition of the property, the Court again cited Thuete
v. Thuete, supra, and held that the deed having been delivered in
escrow, subject only to the performance of the contract by the
vendee, was irrevocable on the part of the grantor and further
the grantor in the absence of default could not forbid its delivery.
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The Court, further, held that nothing was in the record that even
suggested the transaction was colorable because it was not attended with any circumstance indicative of fraud and the other
elements that make a transaction colorable, such as secrecy and
deprivation of the defendants surviving wife, coupled with a retention of possession and control of the property.
The Court disposed of the proposition that the modification
agreement was void under the statute of frauds by ruling that
the terms of payment under the contract had been fully performed
and that the statute of frauds did not operate against executed
oral contracts, Barnes v. Spangler, 98 Colo. 407, 56 P. 2d 31.
(3)

DEED OF MENTAL INCOMPETENT

In Eaton v. Husher, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10, the facts
disclosed that a lunacy complaint was filed in Elbert County Court
against one Hamilton on September 20, 1952; the hearing was not
completed and letters of conservatorship were not issued until November 7, 1952. On October 3, 1952, Hamilton conveyed to the defendants a tract of land in Elbert County in exchange for a small
house in Limon, Colorado and payment of $300 in cash. On December 18, 1952, plaintiff conservator filed suit seeking the cancellation of the deed. The evidence established that the value of the
ranch was $3,475 to $6,675 and the house in Limon from $1,500 to
$3,000. The Court determined that the evidence supported the
conclusions of the trial court, that the consideration was grossly
inadequate; that Hamilton was a mental incompetent and the defendants knew his mental condition and incapacity and that by
their dealing had precluded themselves from having the $300 restored to them, especially in view of the fact that they had disposed of some personal property on the premises. Among other
circumstances in the case it appeared defendants had talked with
the County Judge on October 2, 1952, and he had informed them
of the pending proceeding and that the only way the land could
be sold was by public sale to the highest bidder. It was contended
that a greater burden of proof rested upon plaintiff than is applicable in other civil cases and that the plaintiff had to prove his case
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court said such is not the rule in
Colorado citing House v. Smtih, 117 Colo. 305, 187 P. 2d 587.
(4) EASEMENTS-THE OLD LOGGING ROAD
A question of easement was involved in Turner v. Anderson.
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 2, and from reading the opinion of
the Supreme Court it turned principally on questions of fact. In
July, 1937, the Turners who were the owners of some mountain
property in Gilpin County conveyed an irregularly shaped plot of
ground to Anderson with the following provision: "The purchaser
shall have a right to pass in and out through the L. E. Turner
property to state highway No. 72, where designated by L. E.
Turner."
It appeared that about the time of the conveyance, L. E. Tur-
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ner designated what was more or less a roadway, across the Turner property, connecting with the highway. Mrs. Anderson, the
grantee, however, used another road for egress and ingress to the
highway, referred to as the old logging road. At the time of the
conveyance no part of this logging road was on the Turner property; in 1947 the Turners acquired more property including that
on which the old logging road ran and in 1949 they erected a fence
around all of their property, which obstructed a part of said road.
The Supreme Court held that the conveyance spoke for itself
in no uncertain terms, to the effect that plaintiff was to have the
right to pass in and out of defendant's property at such a place as
was to be designated by defendant, L. E. Turner and that at the
time of the conveyance the defendant, Turner, did not own the
tract traversed by the old logging road nor did he own same until
1947, so that there was no adverse use as far as Turner was concerned, except between 1947 and 1949. Mrs. Anderson testified that
she had the right of way across the road which Turner said he designated and that she had the right of way over the old logging road;
in other words, that she had the right to use either or both roadways regardless of any designation. It appeared that some logging
work had been done over the old logging road by former owners
for their own convenience and that it traversed their land only
and that same was occasionally used by hikers, picnic parties, etc.
The Court described the use as irregular, infrequent, sporadic and
far more permissive than adverse and said it required more than
the irregular use which had been made of same, for it to become
a public highway or to vest a prescriptive'right to its use in Mrs.
Anderson.
(5)

LANDLORD AND TENANT

"TRIVIAL" VIOLATIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER NOT
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY; PAYMENT FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES.

Union Oil Company of Californiav. Lindauer, 1954-55 C.B.A.
Adv. Sh. No. 8, involved, not an oil and gas lease, but a lease of
certain lands in part for livestock grazing and part for farming;
the lease provided among other things that the use of the leased
premises was personal to lessees and that they should not allow
the use of all or any part of the leased premises to other parties
without first obtaining the written consent of lessor, provided that
nothing should be construed to preclude the lessees from making
or entering into contracts or agreements for the pasturage of livestock of third parties so long as the livestock were in the exclusive
control of the lessee and further that in the event of the failure or
refusal on the part of lessees to comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the lease same should at the option of lessor become
in default and lessor take necessary action to cancel the lease and
retake full possession of the leased premises.
It was alleged that defendants had permitted certain parties to
run sheep on the leased premises for consideration without lessors
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consent. There was no abuse or overgrazing shown and the defendant lessees supervised the grazing operations to some extent,
but not exclusively.
The lower court found that the violations were inconsequential.,
insufficient to work a forfeiture of the lease, and that it would be
unconscionable to forfeit lessees rights on account of violations
shown.
The Supreme Court held that this was an action to terminate
the written lease for violations of its terms; that while defendants
answer was a denial of the violations, no claim was made that the
violations were trivial, but only a denial of any violations charged.
That the plaintiff was within its rights in terminating the lease.
The defendants contended that the action should conform to the
requirements of the forcible entry and detainer statute which would
require a verified complaint, but the Court stated it was not pleaded
as a case in equity and quoted 22 Am. Jur. p. 917, Sec. 13, to the
effect that "Ordinarily, in the absence of express provision or necessary implication, a statutory action of forcible entry and detainer
it not exclusive, but is cumulative with respect to any other remedy
that a party may have." Also that the pleading in the case clearly
indicated that it was instituted under Rule 105, R.C.P. Colo., relating to title and possession of real estate. Judgment for the defendant was reversed. On petition for rehearing this opinion was
adhered to, with a slight modification as to the amount to be paid
into the trial court on account of rentals paid by the defendants
for the unused part of the lease.
Another case of landlord and tenant was Ell and L. Investment
Company v. International Trust Company, et al., 1954-55 C.B.A.
Adv. Sh. No. 12. The leased premises consisted of a two story
building at 17th and Larimer Streets in Denver, constructed about
1890. The lease was for a term of 20 years and provided in substance that the lessors should receive a net annual rental of $750
and that all other expenses of every nature whatsoever in connection with the demised premises including taxes, special improvement assessments, insurance premiums, repairs, alterations and
maintenance, water assessments, heat and light, shall be paid by
the lessee and under no circumstances should the lessors be required or called upon to expend any sum in connection with maintenance of the demised premises during the time thereof.
There was also another provision in the lease that the lessee
would not make any alterations, changes or improvements in the
demised premises of a major nature or which should change or
affect the structural soundness of the demised premises without
first having such alterations, improvements or repairs approved
by the lessor and that the lessor would not in any way be liable for
the expense of making any alterations, improvements or repairs of
any nature whatsoever.
The city building inspector served notice upon the lessor to
vacate the premises unless certain alterations were made, because
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the structure was unsafe, in a dilapidated condition and a fire menace. The question arose as to whether the lessor or lessee should
pay for the structural alterations required by the public authority
to make the building safe. The Court cited various provisions of
the lease and determined that it was evident from the language
employed and the circumstances appearing in the record, that the
general intent of the parties was that the expense of all changes
or repairs, structural, as well as otherwise, in this old building,
devolved upon the tenant.
(6) MECHANICS LIENS-FROM SUBCONTRACTOR TO PRINCIPAL
CONTRACTOR

Barr Lwinber Company v. Thompson, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh.
No. 9. involved particularly Sections 15, 16 and 23, Chapter 101,
'35 C.S.A., now 86-3-1, 2, 9, '53 C.R.S.
The Company had furnished materials to Thompson the principal contractor. The owner had failed to comply with the statute,
in not having a written contract recorded, which made the position
of the Company that of a principal contractor. The Court held under these circumstances that since a principal contractor has three
months under the statute in which to file lien claims, the filing of
such a claim after the expiration of the two months' period ordinarily allowed to subcontractors and before the expiration of the
three months period allowed to principal contractors is sufficient.
The Court further held it was not necessary that the materialmen
contract personally with the owner for the furnishing of materials
in order to have more than the two months within which to file;
that privity of contract between owners of the property and materialmen is created by the statute wherein the contractor is made
the agent of the owner and obviates the necessity of the materialmen contacting the owner in any matter whatsoever and the fact
of the selling of the material to the contractor and charging same
to his account does not operate as an estoppel to claim a lien under
the mechanic's lien statute. The Court followed Western Roofing
Company v. Fisher, 85 Colo. 5, 273 Pac. 19, wherein the rule was
laid down that where the contract was not filed of record, the lien
claim status of the subcontractor changed with respect to the time
for filing a lien so that it becomes a principal contractor and is
given three months from the completion of the work within which
to file the lien statement.
(7) OPTION TO PURCHASE-TIMELY TENDER
The case of Abrahamson v. Wilson, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh.
No. 11, was an action for decree of specific performance upon an
option for the purchase of real estate for $9,000 of which $6,500
was to be paid when the option was exercised and the balance within one year. The option, dated April 11, 1953, provided that it
was understood that the buyer was attempting to have the property rezoned for business purposes and in view of this, the time
of the option should be twenty days from the time said property
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was rezoned or within ninety days from date, whichever was
shorter. That sellers were to tender abstract of title showing clear
title in themselves upon demand of the buyer, after the property
had been rezoned or if it was not so rezoned and the option was
exercised, then upon ten days notice from buyer; the contract
further providing that after the buyer gave notice of intention
to exercise the option, sellers would tender good and sufficient
warranty deed and the abstract of title and give buyer a reasonable
time to examine same. On May 4th the Board of County Commissioners adopted a resolution, the purpose of which was to rezone
the property in question. On May 26th the purchaser called the
seller on the phone and was informed by the seller that the option
had expired. On May 27th the purchaser made a tender of $6.500
in cash and made formal demand for performance which tender
was refused. The Court pointed out that more than twenty days
had elapsed before the tender of the cash and demand for deed,
but found that the evidence in the case, without dispute, established that plaintiff gave notice of intention to exercise the option,
prior to the date on which the zoning resolution was adopted by
the Board of Commissioners and indicated that grave doubt existed
whether any real issue was taken with the testimony of purchaser
and another witness that demand for an abstract was made on the
sellers within the twenty day period of time. The opinion states
it would be unreasonable for the Court to construe the instrument
to mean that the purchaser should pay the sum of $6,500 to the
sellers before an opportunity had been afforded to examine the
abstract of title to the property involved. A decree of specified
performance was directed.

(8) TAx DEED-"HEREAFTER"
The case of Wigton v. Bedinger, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No.
10, was an action brought by the holder of a tax deed to quiet title.
The defendants claimed that there was no compliance with the
mandate of C.R.S. '53, 137-10-28 in that the notice of the County
Tieasurer did not provide for a time limit of more than five
months or at least three months before the time of issuance of the
treasurers deed. The tax deed and notice were in the record and
disclosed that the property was sold for general taxes of 1931 on
December 12, 1932, and that the property was assessed for that
year at a sum less than $100. Notice of application for the tax
deed was issued by the County Treasurer on October 19, 1953,
reciting tax deed would be issued December 30, 1953, "unless the
same has been redeemed prior to the issuance of said tax deed."
The Court determined that prior to an amendment, being
Chapter 227, S. L. 1937, p. 1053, there was no statutory requirement for notice, except in cases where the property was assessed
for more than $100 and that instant deeds or deeds without notice
were issued at any time after the expiration of three years from
the date of sale for taxes, in accordance with provisions of C.R.S.
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'53, 137-10-20; further that prior to the 1953 revision of the Colorado Statutes, Sec. 255 of said Chapter 227 of the 1937 Session
Laws contained the word "hereafter" providing among other things
that before any purchaser of land hereafter sold for taxes receives
a tax deed, the County Treasurer shall send notice to parties in
interest, not more than five months and at least three months before the time of issuance of the tax deed. The Court points out
that in the 1953 revision the word "hereafter" was omitted, but
in any event the revision was not in effect on the date application
was made by plaintiff for a deed and the land was sold for 1931
taxes and tax certificate issued in 1932, prior to the 1937 amendment now part of 137-10-28.
The Court said that it was obvious that its decision must be
that the property was sold for taxes prior to 1937 amendment of
137-10-28; that the records showed that the assessed valuation was
less than $100 and that no notice was required to be given prior
to the issuance of the tax deed.

TORTS
By RICHARD D. HALL of the Denver Bar

Many interesting and significant decisions in the field of
torts have been handed down by the Colorado Supreme Court during the past year. The most important of these cases, in my opinion, are the following:
(1)

IMPUTATION OF NEGLIGENCE

In Moore v. Skiles, 130 Colo ...... 274 P. 2d 311, the plaintiff,
a passenger in a truck owned jointly by her and her husband, was
injured when the husband drove the truck into a collision with
the defendant's car. The plaintiff, Mrs. Moore, and her husband
were returning home after an evening with friends.
The trial court, over the objection of plaintiff's counsel, instructed the jury that if it found "that the accident would not have
occurred but for the combined negligence of both drivers, then the
plaintiff can not recover for the damages which she claims to have
suffered . . ." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the appeal followed. The Colorado Supreme Court, after
noting the general rule that the negligence of a driver is not to be
imputed to a passenger in the car, Colorado and Southern Railway
Company v. Thomas, 33 Colo. 517, 81 P. 801; Parker v. Ullom, 84
Colo. 433, 271 P. 187; Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Company,
53 Colo. 458, 128 P. 460, then proceeded to hold that the case at
bar fell within a well recognized exception. Thus, where the passenger by reason of joint ownership of the vehicle was in a position to exercise control over the driver, and was physically present
in the automobile, which was being used for a common purpose,
the negligence of the driver, if any, was imputed to the joint owner

